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Abstract 
Responsible Innovation (RI) is often heralded in EU policy circles as a means to achieve ethically acceptable, sustain-
able innovations. Yet, conceptual questions on the specific notion of ‘responsibility’ and to what extent an innovation 
can be ‘responsible’ are only partly addressed. In this chapter the question of responsibility for the indirect negative 
effects of biofuel innovations is explored. While initially hailed as one of the much needed solutions in the global 
struggle against climate change, the use of biofuels has become increasingly criticised. It is argued that the increased 
production of biofuels has put smallholder farmers out of business, has given rise to increased food prices, sparking 
food riots in several countries, while also contributing to further environmental degradation as the demand for new 
biofuels requires the development of new croplands at the cost of forests and peat lands. In the current market-based 
system it is customary to disburden researchers and business companies from any responsibility for the more remote 
consequences of their actions. When harmful consequences are brought about through the mediation of (perhaps 
a long series of ) market transactions, they are often considered inevitable and excusable and not an appropriate 
occasion for invoking anybody’s responsibility. But how broad is the scope of responsibility when it comes to the 
above mentioned social and ecological problems? By invoking the sacred duty to “innovate”, the business company 
could perhaps be exculpated. In our age, innovation is often so much celebrated that many negative impacts are duly 
accepted as the inevitable price of progress. By approaching responsibility from a perspective that takes into account 
the economic and ecological interconnectedness of the world, we show how the debate on Responsible Innovation 
in biofuels becomes tied in with global debates on economic justice and bioscarcity. In conclusion we argue that 
if we—assuming this interconnectedness—take the current requirements of “Responsible” Innovation seriously, it 
would result in a demanding practice that calls for a substantial departure from business as usual, which prompts the 
question to what extent it is reasonable to incorporate what are actually demands for global justice in programs for 
innovation.
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Background
Shortly after the turn of the new millennium, liquid bio-
fuels for the transport sector were endorsed by official 
bodies in Europe and the USA as a most welcome 
contribution for solving the problems of energy scarcity, 
climate change and rural poverty, but have since become 
the target of so much criticism and controversy that the 
present situation looks like a virtual stalemate. In more 
recent years, research policy circles in Europe have 
become enamored by the idea of ‘Responsible Innova-
tion’ (RI) or, in its more expanded version, ‘responsible 
research and innovation’ (RRI). This new approach for 
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the social management of emerging technologies and 
innovations promises to address or avoid the sort of deep 
conflicts that have afflicted the trajectory of biofuels. 
Thus the question automatically arises if the promotion 
and development of biofuels might have been organized 
as an exercise in Responsible Innovation and whether 
this could have made a difference. As this is a counterfac-
tual question (like the notorious ‘what if ’ questions in 
historiography), it is impossible to come up with a 
straightforward and conclusive answer based on empiri-
cal research alone.1 Nonetheless, we will attempt to arrive 
at a plausible answer to this question by creatively com-
bining theoretical considerations and empirical informa-
tion on the initiation and implementation of biofuels 
policies. But first we will present a conceptual scrutiny of 
the twin ideas of RI and RRI.
As the expression ‘Responsible Innovation’ and its 
expanded version are still of recent coinage, they should 
properly give rise to some wonder and surprise. This new 
combination of words duly invites the question to what 
extent innovation can actually be ‘responsible’ and what 
sense of ‘responsibility’ might be implied in this connec-
tion. To explore this question, we start by turning to the 
classical authors Max Weber and John Dewey to give a 
provisional specification to the notion of responsibil-
ity, which can serve as a baseline for our discussion of 
Responsible Innovation in the area of biofuels.
For Weber as well as for Dewey responsibility means 
being accountable for the foreseeable consequences of 
one’s actions and implies an honest and serious attempt 
to actually foresee those consequences to the best of 
one’s ability and knowledge. Both hold that good inten-
tions are not enough for responsible conduct. Weber 
famously distinguished between an ‘ethic of responsibil-
ity’ (Verantwortungsethik) and an ‘ethic of conviction’ 
(Gesinnungsethik). Within the former, “one has to give an 
account of the foreseeable results of one’s action” (or as 
the German original reads: “man [hat] für die (vorausse-
hbaren) Folgen seines Handelns aufzukommen”), within 
the latter, in religious terms, “[one] does rightly and 
leaves the results with the Lord” (Weber 1968, p. 175). 
Weber unreservedly opted for the former. In a simi-
lar vein Dewey held that “our chief moral business is to 
become acquainted with consequences” (Dewey and 
Tufts 1908, p. 464). While Weber’s and Dewey’s view of 
responsibility as being accountable for the foreseeable 
consequences of one’s actions might not be spectacular—
rather it seems quite a common-sense conception that is 
also shared by recent authors who write about the social 
responsibility of scientists (e.g. Douglas 2009; Forge 
1 We like to thank the anonymous reviewer who pointed out the counter-
factual character of our central question, and the possible difficulties this 
brings along.
2008)—nonetheless, this fairly minimal and seemingly 
innocuous conception still proves to have real bite when 
used to critically examine the contemporary approaches 
to Responsible Innovation.
It is generally agreed that innovation is a collective pro-
cess that involves many different actors and often exhib-
its unexpected twists and turns in its trajectory over 
time. The ultimate societal and environmental conse-
quences of a particular innovation are therefore virtually 
unpredictable. This radical uncertainty of innovation 
processes, which partly springs from their collective 
character, is also duly recognized by advocates of Respon-
sible Innovation: “The unpredictability of innovation is 
inherently linked to its collective nature” (Stilgoe et  al. 
2013, p. 1569; cf. Ozdemir et al. 2011). The puzzle, then, 
is what ‘responsibility’ could still mean under such cir-
cumstances. Following Weber and Dewey, one would be 
inclined to call research and innovation ‘responsible’ if 
and only if their protagonists are willing and able to take 
accountability for, or “stand up for”, the societal and envi-
ronmental consequences of their endeavors (remember 
Weber’s phrase “aufkommen für die Folgen”). If there is 
practically no way to predict or foresee such conse-
quences, however, all talk about responsibility in this 
context would seem to be groundless and misleading. 
Matters become even more complicated when we realize 
that innovation as a collective process partly occurs 
through economic transactions on the market.2
In the traditional liberal conception of the market sys-
tem it is quite customary to relieve economic actors from 
any responsibility for the more remote consequences of 
economic competition and technological and commer-
cial innovation. When harmful consequences are brought 
about cumulatively through the mediation of (perhaps a 
long series of ) market transactions, they are often con-
sidered inevitable and excusable and not an appropriate 
occasion for invoking anybody’s remedial responsibility 
(Miller 2001, p. 458). So when one supermarket A drives 
supermarket B out of business “by offering a better ser-
vice to customers”, we would probably be inclined to 
agree that in that case supermarket A bears no special 
responsibility to compensate supermarket B for the eco-
nomic damage the latter incurred through A’s actions.
The doctrines of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
and Responsible Innovation (RI) run counter to this con-
ventional wisdom. In CSR there are for instance activists 
in the worldwide anti-sweatshop movement, who have 
been quite successful in convincing Western consum-
ers and multinational companies that they bear some 
responsibility for the fate of far-away workers toiling in 
2 According to Schumpeter, such transactions are in fact a defining char-
acteristic of ‘innovation’; without them, there is only ‘invention’ but no real 
‘innovation’(Schumpeter 1939, p. 84).
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nominally independent subcontractor firms in the ini-
tial stages of the value chain of the international garment 
industry (Young 2004). In a similar vein the advocates of 
Responsible Innovation try to mitigate the possible social 
and ecological problems that arise from development of 
novel (technological) innovations.
Nonetheless, both these currents of thought are them-
selves far from clear about where to draw the lines in 
delimiting the scope of responsibility for the social and 
ecological consequences of new scientific and techno-
logical developments. Moreover, widening the scope of 
responsibility also dramatizes the epistemic problem 
concerning the limited predictability of the consequences 
of research and innovation.
Scholars in Responsible Innovation have tried to over-
come this problem of limited predictability of the conse-
quences of innovations by turning to methods of public 
deliberation and public participatory decision making. 
The basic idea is that by involving the public in the delib-
eration and decision-making about an innovation pro-
ject from the earliest stages on, and being “responsive” 
to their “concerns”, we can compensate for our limited 
predictive capabilities (Stilgoe et  al. 2013). This way it 
would also be possible to evade David Collingridge’s well-
known control dilemma, which holds that early on a new 
technology is not amenable to social control because at 
that stage the consequences are still unclear, while later 
on, when the consequences become manifest, the tech-
nology is so much entrenched that it can no longer be 
steered in a desirable direction (Collingridge 1980).
The trick is to use the “societal concerns” about pos-
sible future effects of an innovation as expressed by the 
public in the present (real-time) as a stand-in for the vir-
tually unforeseeable future consequences and then to 
feed those “concerns” back into the on-going research 
and development work (Fisher 2005). When the innova-
tors are genuinely responsive to the public’s concerns, 
they should be able to curb these possible future negative 
effects.
Various forms of foresight and forecasting figure 
prominently in the armamentarium of Responsible Inno-
vation—indeed, ‘anticipation’ is considered one of its 
central dimensions, next to ‘reflexivity’, ‘inclusion’ and 
‘responsiveness’ (Stilgoe et al. 2013)—but the meaning of 
these words seems to deviate from their normal sense. As 
David Guston clarifies, “anticipatory governance involves 
a rejection of prediction but an embrace of an approach 
to foresight we call anticipation, which casts multiple, 
plausible futures as objects for deliberation rather than a 
single predicted future as an object of pursuit” (Guston 
2010, p. 434). What is fed as an input into public delibera-
tion and decision-making about technology development 
is thus not a forecast of the future, but a menu of visions 
of various possible futures, which can then be taken into 
account in the processes of research and innovation.
The turn to public engagement
One can wonder, however, why such visions have to be 
taken seriously as a basis for concern calling for adjust-
ments in the innovation trajectory if they are only slightly 
plausible. The shift from predicting effects to being 
responsive to societal concerns also explains why pub-
lic participation or public engagement is considered an 
essential part of Responsible Innovation. A central role 
for the public is also prescribed by the ideal of a delib-
erative democracy, as set out, for instance, in Habermas’s 
discourse ethics. In a situation of genuinely power-free 
communication, according to Habermas, the only force 
that counts is the force of the better argument. Follow-
ing this line of ethical reasoning, Annelies Balkema and 
Auke Pols argue that the responsibilities of policymak-
ers in Responsible Innovation “include making sure that 
actual stakeholders are identified as such and are invited 
into the discussion, stakeholders representing all relevant 
views can participate in the discussion, and that power 
differences between stakeholders are compensated for as 
much as possible, in order to create a level playing field” 
(Balkema and Pols 2015, p. 8). Moreover, the participants 
in the discussion have to engage in rational argumenta-
tion. They are expected to give “all values and arguments 
due consideration, and not suppressing or excluding any 
relevant argument” (ibid.).
Critics, however, claim that discourse ethics is unduly 
idealistic and that the procedural requirements for com-
municative rationality are far too demanding to be prac-
tically implemented in real-life institutional settings. Just 
to call for an ‘open’ debate is a meaningless gesture if no 
“frame” is provided to define the issues at stake—without 
a frame, there is no disagreement but only indifference. 
Setting a frame, however, implies establishing relation-
ships of power (Torgersen and Schmidt 2013). Some crit-
ics go further and call into question not just the practical 
feasibility but the normative desirability of the ideal of 
power-free communication. The Danish economic geog-
rapher Bent Flyvbjerg, for one, considers the very attempt 
to purify communicative rationality from power, rhetoric 
and strategic opportunism as fundamentally misguided 
(Flyvbjerg 1998), while the Belgian philosopher Chantal 
Mouffe insists that democratic politics is not a utopian 
quest for an unforced consensus, but a pluralistic process 
of contestation and confrontation marked by ineradicable 
antagonism (Mouffe 2009).
These alternative views in political philosophy also lead 
to a more skeptical assessment of the role and poten-
tial of public engagement in Responsible Innovation. Its 
advocates often lament the strategic reason policymakers 
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sometimes invoke for setting up participation initia-
tives as a way to ensure public support for the delivery 
of a pre-committed policy (Owen et  al. 2012, p. 753; 
Stilgoe et al. 2013, p. 1573). However, it would be amaz-
ing if such strategic motives were absent given what is 
at stake for the various parties. After all, in the battle for 
the hearts and minds of the populace to which a public 
participation exercise ultimately boils down, each inter-
ested party has its own axe to grind (cf. Van Oudheusden 
2014). Furthermore, deliberative initiatives do not neces-
sarily guarantee full societal consensus, as groups with 
radical or non-reformist worldviews tend to be excluded, 
or exclude themselves, from participating in the delibera-
tion (Schouten et al. 2012). A case in point is the almost 
continuous public engagement with agricultural biotech-
nology: “From surveys to focus groups to citizen juries, 
GM crops have probably been engaged with more than 
any other technology, but this has not helped to build 
societal consensus in Europe” (Tait and Barker 2011, p. 
766). These theoretical insights and practical findings 
give reason to at least tone down the high expectations 
that discourse ethics and deliberative democracy have 
vested in public participation initiatives.
From a business angle, the emphasis on reflexivity and 
“opening up” rather than “closing down” (Stirling 2008) in 
current versions of Responsible Innovation may also be 
problematic. Understandably, companies will be reluc-
tant to commit large funds to risky innovative projects 
as long as everything is up for grabs. Critical social sci-
entists have perfected the art of questioning framing 
assumptions, but have largely ignored the difficult task of 
bringing a public debate to a timely conclusion.
In many European countries public engagement with 
new technologies (e.g. nanotechnology) is routinely 
organized as a part of official research and innovation 
policy, but laypersons are often reluctant to participate. 
The professional organizers of participatory events have 
sometimes much difficulty to recruit sufficient numbers 
of willing participants. On occasion, citizens’ dialogue 
meetings take place—without citizens (Bogner 2012, p. 
509). One avowed reason why ordinary citizens show lit-
tle enthusiasm to take part in “upstream engagement” is 
that at an early stage of development the possible future 
impacts of a new technology are still unclear even to the 
experts. Perhaps the attempt to square the circle of lim-
ited predictive capacity by involving the wider public is 
bound to fail after all.
Provisional balance‑sheet
Our preliminary, theoretically informed analysis of 
the notion of Responsible Innovation given above 
thus already raises several skeptical points. The overall 
impression is that the currently popular approach would 
still fall short of adequately addressing the problem of 
“responsibility” in the context of research, innovation 
and technology development. According to Weber and 
Dewey, one is to be held responsible for the “foreseeable” 
consequences of one’s actions, but in the context of RI 
the problem is precisely the limited “foreseeability” of the 
future consequences of innovation, despite the fact that 
RI virtually amounts to a sustained attempt at exercising 
“foresight”. Nor can this problem, it seems, be solved or 
compensated for by engaging the wider public. It remains 
to be seen to what extent the problematic issues that we 
identified above actually emerge in concrete processes of 
research and innovation in novel technologies and how 
they are (or could be) dealt with in such settings. We thus 
turn in the next section to the global biofuel debate in 
order to examine an actual example. We first set out how 
the process of biofuel innovation and the corresponding 
biofuel policies have developed over the past years and 
then explore the negative direct and especially indirect 
effects which have been contestably attributed to this 
once almost unilaterally welcomed solution in the global 
quest for sustainable energy.
A thumbnail sketch of US and EU biofuels policy
At the start of the new millennium liquid biofuels for the 
transport sector were hailed both in the USA and in 
Europe as a welcome climate-neutral solution for the 
problem of energy supply. By mandatory blending of 
bioethanol and biodiesel obtained from agricultural 
crops with petrol and diesel, a modest initial impetus 
could be given for a necessary transition towards a future 
‘bio-economy’, which would no longer be based on fossil 
resources. In due course these so-called ‘first-generation’ 
biofuels would be followed by more advanced (‘second-
generation’ and even ‘third-generation’) biofuels.3
However, the honeymoon period for the first genera-
tion of biofuels was not to last for long (Van den Belt 
et al. 2008, pp. 37–72). Their reputation received a severe 
blow in the year 2007 when it appeared that the compe-
tition of the increasing production of biofuels with food 
production (“fuels versus foods”) was one of the underly-
ing causes of the rise in food prices that led to food riots 
among the urban poor in several developing countries. 
The following year the journal Science published two 
quantitative studies (Fargione et  al. 2008; Searchinger 
3 “First-generation biofuels are produced from crops which are also used for 
food production or animal feedstuff. Second-generation biofuels are pro-
duced from biomass which cannot serve as food or feedstuff […]. Propo-
nents claim that second-generation fuels will remove competition with food 
production. Some observers also talk about third-generation fuels derived 
from algae, which is claimed to alter energy production completely in the 
future. Whereas the first-generation fuels are already in wide commercial 
circulation, second-generation ones are still not commercially viable and 
third-generation fuels are still in early R&D stages” (Hansen 2014, p. 80).
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et  al. 2008), which suggested that the large-scale culti-
vation of biofuel crops might on balance increase rather 
than decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by induc-
ing (direct and indirect) changes in land use. Environ-
mental NGOs that had initially supported the switch to 
biofuels, now turned against it. Developmental NGOs 
joined the opposition on the grounds that a boom in 
biofuels would endanger food security and lead to land 
grabbing and the further marginalization of vulnerable 
groups in developing countries. Proponents of biofuels 
(encompassing biotech companies, farmers and research-
ers) often admitted that the first generation of biofuels is 
far from perfect, but pinned their hopes on the develop-
ment of more advanced generations, which would fulfill 
the promise of climate neutrality after all and mitigate or 
even eliminate any competition with food production. In 
their view the first generation, however problematic, is an 
indispensable stepping stone towards later generations 
and cannot be skipped.
In recent years much of the debate about biofuels has 
concentrated on the details of the regulatory regime 
aimed at stimulating and channeling the deployment 
and development of these alternatives for fossil trans-
port fuels. Both the US government and the EU rely 
on mandatory blending targets as their primary policy 
instrument. Thus, the European Commission Renewable 
Energy Directive of 2009 envisages that 10 % of all trans-
port fuel must come from renewable sources (mainly 
biofuels) by 2020. The EU also sets out some minimal 
sustainability criteria. Biofuels must achieve greenhouse 
gas savings of at least 35 % in comparison to fossil fuels, 
cannot be grown in areas converted from land with pre-
viously high carbon stock such as wetlands and forests, 
and cannot be obtained from high biodiversity areas like 
primary forests. In 2012 the European Commission (EC) 
issued a proposal to amend both Directives with the aim 
of limiting the use of first-generation biofuels to only half 
of the 10 % target for 2020 and to stimulate a more rapid 
development and deployment of second-generation and 
third-generation biofuels (EC 2012).
The Commission touched upon a very sensitive issue 
when it also suggested in 2012 that providers and EU 
member countries should report on emissions that might 
be caused by “indirect land use change” (ILUC).4 The 
issue of ILUC is a bone of contention among the various 
parties, meeting all the criteria of a “wicked problem” 
(Palmer 2012). While environmental and developmental 
4 “Decisions regarding land for biofuels can have adverse consequences far 
beyond the land directly in question. For example, if fertile land now used 
for food crops (such as corn, soybeans, palm nuts, or rapeseed) is used to 
produce bioenergy, this could lead, elsewhere in the world, to farmers clear-
ing wild lands to meet displaced demand for crops. In this way, indirect 
land-use effects of biofuels can lead to extra greenhouse gas emissions, bio-
diversity loss, and higher food prices” (Tilman et al. 2009, p. 271).
NGOs insist on the need to actually include (and not just 
report about) ILUC estimations when determining which 
fuels may count as renewable, industry representatives 
denounce their use because they claim there is no proper 
scientific methodology on which they might be based. At 
the time of writing, the ILUC issue and the problem of 
how to promote the development of second-generation 
biofuels, are still unresolved within the European 
institutions.
The indirect social and environmental effects 
of biofuels: a contested issue
When it comes to the indirect social and environmental 
effects of the production and use of biofuels we see an 
ongoing discussion on both whether there are such prob-
lems and which actor(s) should carry responsibility for 
these issues.
ILUC effects have been controversial ever since the 
quantitative study by Tim Searchinger et  al. was pub-
lished in 2008. Searchinger and his colleagues concen-
trated on the indirect effects of expanding the area of 
biofuel crops. They calculated that a planned increase of 
US corn ethanol production of 56 billion liters in 2016, 
diverting 12.8 million ha of US cropland from food and 
feed production and inducing the cultivation of an extra 
10.8 million ha of land elsewhere and on other conti-
nents, would nearly double GHG emissions over 30 years 
and increase greenhouse gases for 167  years. They thus 
conclude: “Use of good cropland to expand biofuels will 
probably exacerbate global warming in a manner similar 
to directly converting forest and grasslands” (Searchinger 
et al. 2008, p. 1240).
Not all actors in the biofuel debate have been keen to 
accept the findings of the Searchinger report. In Europe 
representatives of the biofuel industry have been com-
plaining about the unfavorable investment climate result-
ing from the current political indecision in Europe, 
resulting from the research on ILUC effects. For instance, 
Robert Wright, secretary-general of ePure, the associa-
tion of the European ethanol industry, laments that the 
“ILUC cloud” hanging over the industry and the Com-
mission’s policy turn have destroyed investor confidence: 
“For investments to take place we need stable, clear 
and long-term policies and no policy u-turns” (Wright 
quoted in Maler 2014). In a similar vein the Danish bio-
tech firm Novozymes, which has a strong interest in the 
development of second-generation biofuels (because it 
specializes in making enzymes, which will be needed if 
cellulose is to be broken down), opposes accounting for 
ILUC effects. As a company spokesman explains: “ILUC 
is a controversial concept. The belief behind the concept 
is that the displacement of other land-using activities, 
caused by biofuels expansion, contributes to greenhouse 
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gas emissions elsewhere—and this should be factored 
into the lifecycle analysis of biofuels. As such, ILUC can-
not be calculated but only modelled, and variations in 
models show very different figures. It is therefore also 
very difficult to base legislation on it” (Amrani 2015; 
Novozymes, n.d.).
In the United States the findings of the Searchinger 
study have been severely criticized by the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization (BIO) and the New Fuels Alliance, 
industry groups with an important stake in US biofuels 
production. They believed that Searchinger and his team 
underestimated the possibilities of technological progress 
in biofuels and agriculture generally and they also held 
that the inclusion of indirect effects like land use changes 
would necessitate the use of “very complex econometric 
models” (BIO 2008). The two industry groups suggested 
to cling to Standard Life Cycle Analyses (which exclude 
consideration of indirect effects) on the grounds that 
we do not have the sophisticated models to adequately 
deal with land-use changes (BIO 2008; New Fuels Alli-
ance 2008). It can be readily admitted that adequately 
modeling land-use changes is extremely difficult, but 
the industry response is still remarkable. Their position 
actually amounts to turning a blind eye to such indirect 
effects, perhaps in the hope that they will not be there if 
we do not look for them.
Not surprisingly, the US biofuels industry declined 
any responsibility for increased GHG emissions through 
land-use changes. They also tried to lay this responsibility 
at the doors of governments, as the Biotechnology Indus-
try Organization declared: “Indirect land use changes are 
a function of land use policy. Sustainable biofuels pro-
duction must go hand-in-hand with sustainable land use 
policy” (BIO 2008). In other words, it is up to the govern-
ments of biofuel producing countries like Brazil, Indo-
nesia or Malaysia to prevent that the pressure on land to 
meet the increased demand for biofuel will lead to fur-
ther deforestation.
What the organization did not say is that such a policy, 
if it were in place, might reduce food production. As the 
Searchinger study observes: “Effective controls on land 
conversion would constrain the major source of new sup-
ply to meet increased biofuel demands, resulting in less 
additional cropland and higher market prices as markets 
seek equilibrium. In that event, more greenhouse benefits 
would stem in reality from reduced food consumption” 
(Searchinger et  al. 2008, p. 1240; our italics).5 It seems 
that using land for the growing of biofuel crops competes 
with using land for food production or keeping it as 
5 In a more recent article, Searchinger et al. (2015) show that according to 
the three major models that inform US and EU biofuels policy, ethanol poli-
cies in fact are relying on decreases in food consumption to generate savings 
in greenhouse gas emissions.
forest or wilderness areas. There is in fact a “food-energy-
environment trilemma” (Tilman et  al. 2009). This tri-
lemma can be evaded by biofuels from waste streams and 
from perennials on degraded farmland or from algae 
grown in the desert (there is not much carbon in the 
desert). The scope for such possibilities appears however 
rather limited (cf. Hansen 2014).
Land conversion due to the worldwide boom in biofu-
els may also have social consequences, e.g. in the form 
of indigenous peoples being evicted from their tradi-
tional homelands to make room for palm oil plantations 
or farmland for growing biofuel crops. In 2012 alone the 
organization Sawit Watch (Palm Oil Watch) reported 660 
land conflicts raging over biofuels cultivation in Indone-
sia (EurActive 2012).
Who is to be held accountable for such consequences? 
In 2008 the European Parliament made a first attempt to 
take responsibility for these negative consequences as 
it proposed to include social aspects like land rights of 
local communities and fair remuneration of workers in 
the sustainability criteria for biofuels. However, it later 
decided against mandatory social criteria “because of 
the difficulty to verify the link between individual biofuel 
consignments and the respect of these particular crite-
ria” (Levidow 2013, p. 217; quoting from a Commission 
document). An additional reason was the fear that man-
datory certification for social standards, as a potential 
violation of global trade rules, could face challenges by 
producer countries before the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism (ibid.). The upshot is that the responsibility 
for protecting indigenous land rights and workers’ rights, 
which may come under pressure as an indirect conse-
quence of the increased European demand for biofuels, 
is not accepted by the European Union, but is put into 
the hands of the governments of the producer countries. 
From a legal and political angle, it is arguable that this 
is precisely where such responsibility properly belongs. 
However, in practice many governments in developing 
countries are not actively defending the customary land 
tenure rights or labor rights of vulnerable groups in soci-
ety, but are more or less complicit in what has unofficially 
been termed ‘land grabbing’ to such an extent that a new 
massive global wave of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is 
going on (White and Dasgupta 2010).
All this leaves us with an interesting but difficult philo-
sophical puzzle about the proper distribution of respon-
sibilities. When political institutions take the lead in 
designing a regulatory regime for the development and 
deployment of biofuels, it is natural to also grant them 
primary responsibility for the social and environmen-
tal consequences. However, this does not remove the 
responsibility of other parties like business companies, 
industry associations and civil society organizations, if 
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only because they all take policy stances and are actively 
engaged in trying to influence the regulatory regime 
through lobbying (Miller 2001; Young 2011).
The setting of ambitious blending targets for the use 
of biofuels in the US and the EU sets in motion a long 
train of causation, which arguably ends up with the fur-
ther marginalization of vulnerable social groups in devel-
oping countries, the clearance of forests and peat lands 
and the conversion of grasslands into croplands, the loss 
of biodiversity and perhaps a reduction of food produc-
tion and perhaps also a net increase in GHG emissions. 
However, this is not a train of (purely) physical causa-
tion, but (at least partly) of social causation, meaning 
that it occurs through the economic and political deci-
sions of all the actors that make up the successive links 
of the chain. It would seem, therefore, that the US and 
European governments operating at the start of the chain 
could legitimately pass the responsibility for averting cer-
tain negative social and environmental consequences on 
to later links in the chain, to wit, to the governments in 
the developing countries where these consequences are 
bound to manifest themselves; after all, it is in the power 
of these latter governments to prevent these effects from 
happening by properly protecting nature and the rights 
of the population. But what if the governments in the 
developing countries refuse or fail to take up this respon-
sibility? Does (part of ) it then devolve back to the US and 
the EU governments? Could these governments justifi-
ably have decided to pass on the responsibility to their 
Third-World counterparts in the first place on the highly 
plausible assumption that the latter would not take it up? 
After all, one important tenet of Weber’s Verantwortung-
sethik is that we take the world as it is, not as it ideally 
should be. And should we only talk about the responsi-
bilities of political agencies in this context? What about 
the responsibilities of business companies, scientists, and 
civil society organizations?
In this connection it is interesting to note that the 
public authorities of the EU did not themselves take 
steps to ensure compliance with the (minimal) sustain-
ability criteria the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) 
sets for biofuels, but actually relied on stakeholder plat-
forms consisting of business organizations and NGOs 
to implement voluntary schemes for certifying “sustain-
able” biofuels (Richardson 2014). Thus the Roundtable 
on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) created in 2010 a vol-
untary add-on to the existing RSPO standard to enable 
producers to comply with the EU’s sustainability criteria 
(RSPO-RED). Similar schemes have been set up by other 
stakeholder platforms like Bonsucra (sugarcane-based 
biofuels from Brazil) or the Roundtable for Sustainable 
Biofuels. In 2012, the European Commission recognized 
several of these voluntary certification schemes. It can be 
argued that the public authorities in the EU have passed 
the practical responsibility for ensuring compliance 
with their sustainability criteria onto the private sector. 
Although ‘reformist’ NGOs like the Worldwide Fund for 
Nature are generally willing to participate in such stake-
holder platforms, more radical environmental organiza-
tions like Friends of the Earth tend to keep aloof from 
them (Schouten et  al. 2012). Radical NGOs point out 
that, by their very nature, certification schemes cannot 
deal with ILUC effects. Even if the certification standard 
went beyond the quite minimal EU criteria, it would still 
be unable to capture such effects (Richardson 2014).
The above discussion suggests that current views on 
Responsible Innovation might not offer us much guid-
ance on how to set up an intelligent policy for biofuels. 
It seems that societal decision-making has got stuck in a 
stalemate where different actors favor conflicting policies 
and mutually block each other’s preferred options. The 
biofuels case amply illustrates the limited predictability 
of the social and environmental impacts of innovations, 
but does not bear out the expectation that being “respon-
sive” to the expressed “concerns” of the public and civil 
society can somehow make up for this deficiency. Disa-
greement immediately resurfaces about which concerns 
are serious enough to be addressed and what constitutes 
an adequate and sufficient response. Policy-makers have 
indeed attempted to address concerns about biodiver-
sity loss and enhanced greenhouse gas emissions by set-
ting additional sustainability criteria, but these measures 
are themselves contested and have often been judged 
insufficient. Most revealing is the endless dispute about 
ILUC effects. The EU has commissioned no less than fif-
teen scientific studies on this topic, all with different and 
highly divergent outcomes (EurActiv 2015).
In order to get a clearer understanding of what respon-
sible action could mean within the biofuel debate, we will 
further reflect on the concept of responsibility and con-
nect this to Responsible Innovation in the biofuel debate.
Reframing the ethical issues: responsibility in an 
interconnected world
In this section we will reflect further on the deeper roots 
of the difficulty of “responsible” innovation in the bio-
fuels field. Besides the widely recognized uncertainty of 
innovation processes in general and the limited predicta-
bility of their effects, we think we should also point to the 
terrestrial reach of biofuel innovations, which are played 
out, so to say, in the global theatre of an economically and 
ecologically interconnected world. We will build on an 
article written by the American bioethicist Paul Thomp-
son to elaborate on the economic aspect of this intercon-
nected world and on an article by the Danish sociologist 
Janus Hansen to elaborate on the ecological aspect. These 
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two aspects will then have to be combined. Proponents of 
biofuels generally hold that the dilemma of “food versus 
fuel” which still afflicts the first generation of biofuels will 
be overcome when the progress of technology allows us 
to switch to the more advanced second en third genera-
tions in the near and foreseeable future. Even the more 
comprehensive “food-energy-environment trilemma” will 
then likely be overcome thanks to gains in efficiency. Both 
Thompson and Hansen, however, offer arguments to the 
effect that the expected technological progress is actually 
unable to resolve the underlying ethical dilemmas.
Thompson’s economic interconnectedness
Thompson argues that the focus on non-food crops to 
escape from the food-versus-fuel dilemma misses the 
mark. If a farmer grew miscanthus or jatropha instead of 
maize as a fuel crop, this would just as well affect the sup-
ply of maize for food, albeit more indirectly. Ultimately, 
due to the interconnection of the markets for agricultural 
products, all the various forms of land use are in com-
petition with each other. Nor would the development 
of cellulosic ethanol resolve the tension. As Thompson 
remarks, “the ethical issue is not one of finding techni-
cally feasible alternatives to crops currently used for food. 
It is rather in the socio-economic priorities that dictate 
which of many technically feasible possibilities will be 
realized in practice” (Thompson 2012, p. 347). In fact, the 
successful development of cellulosic ethanol would even 
put food and fuel production into more direct competi-
tion with each other, at least theoretically, because if cel-
lulose can be converted into sugar and starch the latter 
could theoretically also be processed further into food 
rather than being transformed into ethanol for blend-
ing with petrol. The fact that no practical technologist 
would pursue this ‘theoretical’ goal only reflects the rela-
tive value judgments that are embodied in current world 
prices for food and fuel and thus underscores precisely 
the ethical point Thompson is trying to make. As a soci-
ety we place so much more value on driving our cars than 
on ending world hunger, that we uncritically accept the 
relative prices of fuel and food that express our valuations 
as the correct signals for economic action. This not only 
holds for allocating given resources in the market, but 
also for decisions to pursue certain research lines aimed 
at developing new resources. Here we find a similar 
moral issue: “The fact that poor people cannot compete 
with rich people for basic grains is structurally isomor-
phic to the fact that they cannot compete with the rich 
when it comes to land use allocation or to capital invest-
ment in new technology” (ibid., p. 349). In line with 
Thompson’s analysis we can reframe and generalize the 
underlying ethical issue in the food-versus-fuel dilemma. 
The ultimate ethical problem, then, is that the priorities 
and the claims of the rich carry so much more weight 
in world markets than the needs of the poor, both in 
determining what gets produced and in determining the 
direction of the research effort. Just as pharmaceutical 
research is skewed in serving the desires of the rich rather 
than the needs of the poor (by developing drugs against 
baldness or erectile dysfunction rather than against Cha-
gas disease), so the biotechnological research aiming at 
advanced generations of biofuels is similarly driven first 
and foremost by the priorities of the rich (Pogge 2005). 
In a finite world this will lead to a further displacement 
of the needs of the poor. We may add to Thompson’s 
analysis that it is mainly the institutional mechanism of 
the patent system (itself a global system since the TRIPS 
Agreement of 1994) that connects the research effort to 
the wants and priorities of the rich (Timmermann and 
Van den Belt 2013; Pogge 2005).
Hansen’s ecological interconnectedness
One of the basic tenets of ecology is that we live in a 
world of finite resources. This view is orthogonal to 
the optimistic faith in progress, according to which our 
knowledge grows at an exponential rate and the poten-
tialities of science and technology are virtually without 
limit—so much so that they can ultimately also over-
come the finiteness of earthly resources. These two views 
have been pitted against each other ever since the clas-
sical dispute between the marquis de Condorcet and the 
Reverend Thomas Malthus at the end of the 18th century. 
Janus Hansen (2014) discerns in the Danish debate on 
biofuels two distinct scientific perspectives which can 
be seen as modern versions of these classical positions. 
With the technologically optimistic position corresponds 
what Hansen calls the “reductionist biorefinery perspec-
tive”; while the more pessimistic position which stresses 
the limits to growth corresponds  to what he calls the 
“holistic bioscarcity perspective” (Hansen 2014). Both 
perspectives derive from different scientific fields. The 
first perspective originates from biochemistry and neigh-
boring disciplines (including molecular biology, biotech-
nology and synthetic biology), the second from life-cycle 
analysis, environmental science and ecology. The first 
works upward from the molecular level while the second 
works downward from the global resource situation. The 
two perspectives form the scientific core of two differ-
ent advocacy coalitions, which act in the political arena 
to lobby for their preferred policy lines. Thus the reduc-
tionist biorefinery perspective is linked to the coalition 
of biofuels optimists consisting of the enzyme-producing 
biotech companies Novozymes and Danisco, biofuels 
producers (e.g. DONG) and agricultural interests. The 
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holistic bioscarcity perspective is linked to the coali-
tion of biofuels skeptics, comprising environmental and 
developmental NGOs but also parts of the conventional 
energy sector.
We believe the distinction made by Hansen between 
these two perspectives serves not only to clarify the 
Danish debate on biofuels, but also sheds light on simi-
lar debates elsewhere. The optimistic perspective is 
informed by the guiding vision of the biorefinery as “a 
generic process technology, whereby any biomass can 
be transformed into a plant-based equivalent of crude 
oil” (ibid., 82). In this perspective, biomass is seen as an 
abundant resource. It is up to our scientific ingenuity to 
fully exploit the potential of this resource (e.g. by enzy-
matic degradation of celluloses). Any technical problems 
confronting us in this trajectory are just challenges that 
can be overcome by (further) research and innovation, 
provided the right regulatory policies (like blending tar-
gets, subsidies and tax credits) are in place to provide 
adequate economic incentives. While the adherents of 
this perspective admit that first-generation biofuels are 
somewhat problematic, they also hold that they are a 
necessary first step to develop an infrastructure for the 
second and third generation. Anyway, with the arrival of 
these more advanced generations the food-versus-fuel 
dilemma will be finally solved.
In the pessimist perspective, by contrast, biomass is 
considered a scarce resource. The biofuels skeptics are 
less willing to mortgage the future by signing up today 
on the seductive promises of our scientific ingenuity and 
hold that the distinction between the first generation and 
more advanced generations of biofuels ultimately does 
not make much of a difference. They notice that West-
ern countries like Denmark, despite all talk about bio-
mass as an abundant resource, are unable to supply their 
own domestic needs and rely on large-scale imports of 
biomass from developing countries. They fear that the 
expected growth in biomass consumption, not just due 
to increased use of liquid biofuels for road transport, but 
also to satisfy other virtually insatiable Western desires 
and priorities, will negate any sustainability gains and 
shift the burden onto fragile ecologies and communities. 
Or as Hansen remarks, “skeptics … see biofuels as a neo-
colonial project, which will inevitably work to the disad-
vantage of vulnerable people and ecosystems” (ibid., 92).
Acting in an economically and ecologically interconnected 
world
As an analyst Hansen takes a neutral stance towards the 
two perspectives. We think, however, that the “holistic 
bioscarcity perspective” should at least be taken seriously 
as a plausible approach that tries to do justice to the eco-
nomic and ecological interconnectedness of our global 
world.6 In the economy of nature, just as in our human 
economy, there is no such thing as a free lunch. To us it 
seems that the ecological heel of Achilles for biofuels is 
precisely the incredible amounts of biomass that must be 
fed to this hungry monster. Even the latest representa-
tives of scientific optimism, the synthetic biologists work-
ing on advanced biofuels, are confronted with this 
problem. As an environmental NGO writes in a critical 
report, “Synthetic biology enthusiasts work under the 
false assumption that there will be an endless supply of 
biomass and land to fuel their biofuels revolution” 
(Friends of the Earth 2010, 15).
This criticism is supported by the estimation of the 
maximally available worldwide potential of primary bio-
energy, which was made in 2012 by Kolby Smith and his 
colleagues on the basis of satellite data and which placed 
an upper limit to the possible contribution of biofuels. 
They concluded that this potential would be between 
35 and 108  % of worldwide primary energy consump-
tion in the year 2009 (Kolby Smith et al. 2012). Because 
only one-third of this potential is realistically available, 
the newly estimated upper limit is about four times less 
than earlier projections. Thus an economy based entirely 
on biofuels would not even come close to meeting the 
needs of an energy-hungry world: 5 to 15 percent of the 
projected energy demand for 2050 at most (Kolby Smith 
et al. 2012, p. 921).
Proponents of biofuels point at the availability of all 
kinds of agricultural waste and of marginal lands that 
could be deployed for the production of the required 
biomass. They seem to count liberally on the availabil-
ity of unused or underused resources, and according to 
their opponents, they tend to do the accounting in their 
own favor, because in the process they ignore the fact 
that so-called “waste” is actually being used for vari-
ous useful purposes and that “marginal” lands provide a 
source of livelihood to smallholders, nomadic herdsmen 
or indigenous peoples (Friends of the Earth 2010, p. 14). 
Anthropologist Jennifer Baka has shown through detailed 
fieldwork in South India that the so-called “wastelands” 
designated by the government for the cultivation of the 
biofuel crop jathropha had actually been much more 
productive in their previous capacity, both in terms of 
bioenergy production and other useful applications; the 
main net result of the whole process was a massive “land 
grabbing” (Baka 2013, 2014). When so-called marginal 
6 By taking this stance, our position is tilting towards that of the “biofuels 
skeptics” as we adopt a more critical attitude towards current biofuel poli-
cies. We recognize that this position does not fully take into account the 
unresolved epistemic uncertainty policy makers are still confronted with 
(the expectations of the biofuels optimists might turn out to be right, after 
all). Therefore our refusal to take out a mortgage on the future by counting 
on robust technological progress may entail some unfairness in our assess-
ment, however we defend this position on ethical and prudential grounds.
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lands are taken into exploitation, there is also a potential 
conflict with nature conservation, creating an additional 
opposition, namely one of flora-versus-fuel next to the 
food-versus-fuel dilemma (The Economist 2013).
In the socio-economic constellation of our contempo-
rary world, the development of biofuels will most proba-
bly result in indirect external effects like the displacement 
of indigenous communities from marginal lands and the 
replacement of natural ecosystems by biomass mono-
cultures. The research effort, induced by the incentive 
of patents, is one-sidedly oriented to aims that promise 
a tangible profit. In the process, other aims—the ones 
that are not supported by an effective demand backed by 
purchasing power—will be easily sacrificed. These wider 
connections were also broached with admirable clar-
ity in a debate between conservationists and synthetic 
biologists:
“Synthetic life delivers private benefits. Many forms 
of life being developed by synthetic biology are being 
patented. The benefits provided by these organ-
isms will reflect the economic interests of those able 
to invest in and develop them. This may well favor 
applications in existing industrial processes and 
commodity chains (energy, agriculture, aquaculture) 
and the operations of large business corporations. 
Impacts on the wider environment will tend to be 
treated as an externality. Knock-on impacts of price 
and other economic changes on smaller producers 
(e.g. smallholder farmers) will affect their decisions 
about land conversion and management, and hence 
future patterns of biodiversity loss. How will a bal-
ance be struck between private risk and gain versus 
public benefit and safety?” (Redford et al. 2013; our 
italics).
Are researchers and companies co-responsible for such 
indirect effects or can they wash their hands in inno-
cence? A typical response to this question was given by 
Jay Keasling, the Berkeley professor of synthetic biol-
ogy who developed with his team a synthetic precur-
sor of artemisinin, a valuable drug against malaria. This 
achievement is often presented as the poster child of syn-
thetic biology, but there is also a darker side to it. Mak-
ing the artemisinin precursor in a fermentation vat with 
genetically engineered yeasts will cause tens of thousands 
of Asian and African farmers who formerly extracted the 
natural artemisinin product from their sweet wormwood 
crop (Artemisia annua) to lose their livelihoods. When 
confronted with this consequence of his scientific work, 
Keasling replied:
“I don’t make the decision about what gets produced 
[…] The marketplace decides. What I do is provide 
more options” (Keasling quoted in Callaway 2013, p. 
281).
This particular answer led one uncharitable critic to refer 
to the famous lines from Tom Lehrer’s song on the Ger-
man rocket scientist Wernher von Braun:
“Once the rockets are up, who cares where they come 
down.
That’s not my department, says Wernher von Braun” 
(quoted in Shanks 2013).
Given the earlier discussion on economic and ecological 
interconnectedness it would seem that Keasling cannot 
hide in good faith behind the invisible hand of an anon-
ymous market. The extra options he provides as a syn-
thetic biologist have been deliberately chosen rather than 
randomly selected.
What the above discussion makes clear is that there are 
sufficient reasons to attribute not just responsibility to 
governmental actors, but that companies and researchers 
are connected as well to the negative indirect effects of 
the biofuel innovations, which gives them at least a cer-
tain degree of co-responsibility.
Conclusion
The example of biofuels shows that there are limits to 
the extent to which both political bodies and corporate 
actors can effectively assume responsibility for the likely 
consequences of innovations and novel technologies 
within the current global economy. This is not to deny 
that government institutions and companies did indeed 
take some responsibility for the consequences of the 
development of biofuels. In accordance with the precepts 
of Responsible Innovation, the EU showed itself at least 
to some extent “responsive” to the concerns expressed 
by environmental NGOs, e.g. by adjusting policy targets 
or issuing additional sustainability requirements. Com-
panies, on their part, followed voluntary schemes for 
certifying sustainable biofuels. However, whether these 
responses are fully adequate and sufficient is still the sub-
ject of intense debate.
The preceding analysis highlights that there was per-
manent contestation about the exact consequences of 
the use of biofuels and no definitive scientific consen-
sus crystallized about the attribution of alleged conse-
quences to the actions and measures that could be held 
(causally) responsible for them. That is not surprising, 
because we are dealing here with a ‘wicked’ problem, 
as the long chain from initial cause to ultimate effect 
includes an endless number of links involving many mar-
ket transactions and complex natural mechanisms. This 
opens the possibility for political and corporate actors to 
wash their hands in innocence, or rather in ignorance; 
Page 11 of 12Tempels and Van den Belt  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:135 
with some right they may hide themselves behind a veil 
of ignorance. It is always difficult to tell where legitimate 
ignorance passes into wilful ignorance. Connectedness 
is thus on the one hand a general ground for assigning 
responsibility to several multiple actors, as in Young’s 
theoretical approach (cf. Young 2011), but on the other 
hand it tends to assume such unwieldy dimensions here 
that the ‘wicked’ consequences of technological innova-
tion in our economically and ecologically highly inter-
connected world seem to escape the practical grasp of 
any responsibilities that can reasonably be assigned to 
eligible actors, short of changing the basic rules of the 
current global system.
Another way to express the same insight is to say that 
the procedural requirements of inclusion, foresight, 
reflexivity and responsiveness that are held to charac-
terize Responsible Innovation, if taken really seriously, 
would be extremely demanding. They could for instance 
require continuous responsiveness to newly arising (in-)
direct negative effects of innovations. It would no longer 
be acceptable to treat negative societal and environmen-
tal effects as externalities that are passed on through 
market transactions and ecological chain reactions, so 
that unknown people living somewhere else—usually 
the most marginalized and vulnerable—must ultimately 
bear the brunt of the inevitable fallout of our attempts to 
improve the quality of our lives. Ultimately, it would seem 
to call for a radical departure from business as usual and 
one might even argue that this would actually presume 
the existence of a world that is much more equitable and 
just than our present one.
The obvious question then arises as to whether the cri-
teria for Responsible Innovation should be used across 
the board for all innovation processes or only applied 
selectively to particular projects of technology develop-
ment. In the latter, more likely case, the innovators who 
have been singled out for special attention might justifi-
ably complain about double standards: why are they the 
only ones for whom the bar of responsibility has been 
raised to such an incredibly high level? If the criteria 
would be applied across the board, innovators might still 
complain about discrimination of emerging technolo-
gies as against already established technologies. One is 
reminded of venture capitalist and biofuels enthusiast 
Vinod Khosla, who in 2007 entered the food-versus-fuel 
debate by claiming that using maize to produce a gal-
lon of bio-ethanol was much more useful to society than 
using the same amount of the crop for producing a kilo-
gram of beef on your table. Why was all the social criti-
cism so unfairly addressed to biofuels?
If we conceptualize responsibility within Thomp-
son’s and Hansen’s frameworks of interconnectedness, it 
would seem that Responsible Innovation, if its ambitions 
are taken seriously, has little chance to survive in the cur-
rent context of research and innovation policies that are 
primarily oriented to improving the competitiveness of 
European business companies on the world market. The 
former EU Commissioner for research, innovation and 
science who officially launched the idea of Responsible 
Research and Innovation, Máire Georghegan-Quinn, 
also declared in the European Parliament: “We are look-
ing to address all the bottlenecks in innovation. We want 
to translate our excellent research into products that our 
companies can bring to market. Europe needs to remove 
barriers that get in the way of getting from research to 
retail” (EurActiv 2010). But, how responsible can one 
truly be if you have to move as quickly as possible “from 
research to retail”?
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